Introduction
Historically the concepts of the 'Nordic model' and Norden/Nordicity have gained unique status standing for an 'exception' to standard practices in international and economic affairs. The idea of the Nordic model has played at least two important roles.
First, the idea of the 'Nordic exception' and of a particular Nordic way of doing things has been a central element in Nordic and national identity construction for the Nordic states (e.g. Lawler 1997 ). The implication has been that to be Nordic one has to be 'exceptional' (or at least different from the norm) as, for example, during the Cold War when the 'peace-loving and rational' Nordics differentiated themselves from the rest of 'warlike' or 'conflict prone' Europe. Second, the 'idea' of the Nordic model has also been presented as something that can be copied and implemented elsewhere. The Nordic model in this instance has stood for progress, modernisation and for being better than other models. Usually this refers to the socio-economic organisation of the Nordic countries. However, foreign policy elements have also been evident, especially in notions of being bridge-builders and trying to teach people how to build a proper security community, and in terms of a firm Nordic belief in internationalist solidarism and Third So, the Nordic model has stood out both as an identity and as a model to copy. Indeed, I
want to suggest that the idea of the Nordic model has become something of a brand by which to position the Nordics in the world and provide them with an international role.
As such, being 'Nordic' and adhering to the Nordic model has implied engaging in some types of action, and not others. Increasingly, however, it is argued that this 'brand' is now passed its sell-by-date. This is not necessarily to say that the Nordics are changing their behaviour and no longer conforming to the 'model' (though in some instances they may be), but that whether certain practices and attitudes will continue to be understood as specifically 'Nordic' (rather than European, for example) is open to question. The result is that recognition of the 'Nordic brand' is being undermined, which in turn poses questions for the future of the idea of 'Nordic exceptionalism' as a central part of Nordic identity.
The article starts by discussing the idea of identity as a 'brand' that can be projected and marketed to an international audience. Next it lays out a number of factors that have been central to ideas of the Nordic model and the idea of Nordic exceptionalism. It then notes that there are reasons to suggest that each of these elements are now facing challenges such that the idea of a distinct Nordic position or model is increasingly less obvious.
These elements are undermining ideas of the Nordic model as being both an identity and as something to be copied and aspired for by others. In short, it is argued that for various reasons the 'Nordic brand' is losing its marketability. The article concludes with a question: if the Nordic model and brand is passed its sell-by-date is this something to be mourned, or embraced?
Branding Identity
To start a few words about identity and the concept of 'brand' are required. This is important as the concepts of brand and identity, although closely related, are not interchangeable. Thus, the decline of Nordicity and the Nordic model as a brand does not necessarily entail the decline or loss of Nordic identity(ies) as such. So what is the difference between the concepts and what is the benefit of introducing the idea of 'brands' into discussions of the Nordic case?
This article understands identities in constructivist and narrative terms, meaning identities should not be understood as fixed or pre-given, but as fluid and open to change and transformation. Identities are intersubjectively negotiated in interactions with others. To be able to act selves need to construct narratives that locate themselves in time and space and in relation to other actors. Such narratives, however, constantly need retelling and also need to be endorsed and accepted by the relevant audience if an identity or set of identities is to hang together.
1 This last point is important in that since selves (including collectivities like nations) are embedded in many different relationships selves characteristically have multiple, not singular, identities. Indeed, the very unit that is understood as the self may expand and contract as one shifts between relationships. Thus, whilst a person's identification may shift between being a 'woman', 'mother', 'industrialist', 'explorer' etc., depending on the social context in which that individual finds herself, in other contexts that individual may meld into a bigger collective self in which the unit of self might be a family, team, trade union, nation, civilisation etc… This is all broadly accepted, but the point about multiplicity is important when differentiating between identities and brands. Whereas identities need to be seen as multiple and fluid and also as being projective into the future, the concept of 'brand' is arguably more specific. The concept is usually used in regard to the economic marketplace and the buying and selling of commodities. In this respect a brand is usually understood as a particular version of a particular thing, a brand of car for example. However, as Klein (2000) notes, sometimes brands become ends in themselves: the brand itself becomes the product, the brand standing for a particular lifestyle choice or political philosophy (e.g. Body Shop). In such instances the actual material 'product' becomes less important than the idea (brand) being sold. As will become evident below, and as argued 1 On narrative approaches to identity see Carr (1986); Ringmar (1996); Schrag (1997) .
by Kuisma elsewhere in this volume, to some extent the brand of the 'Nordic model' has developed elements of this about it, where it is not so much what the Nordic model actually is that counts, but rather what it is seen to stand for. Thus, the article is more concerned with the 'idea' of the Nordic model as representing a deviation from the norm or as something to be copied, rather than with its particular content per se -though the two are obviously closely connected. In general terms, however, in the marketplace branding is used to try and convince people to buy one product instead of another and where a successful brand gets a reputation for being better (however defined) than other brands. As such the brand becomes something people recognise, admire and even aspire to have or associate with. Brands, however, can also lose popularity, appearing worse than other brands or seeming outdated.
This article argues that during the Cold War the Nordic States were rather successful in marketing a 'Nordic brand' on the international scene. This brand had various elements to it, as will be demonstrated below, but included a particular socio-economic model and approach to international affairs (content) as well as simply the 'idea' that the Nordic model represented something distinct. Whilst these ideas and elements were important aspects of identity construction, the notion of brand points to the rather strategic way in which the Nordic brand was depicted, first as better than other brands (of state/foreign policy) and, second, as something that others could, in theory at least, buy into and purchase in the marketplace of ideas. Moreover, whilst identities can be understood as malleable and relatively hard to pin down the idea of brand in this instance points to a set 2 For a discussion of the concept of brand see Keller (2003: ch.1). of ideas, norms and practices that might be conceived in terms of an overall (if loosely defined) package. The aim of marketing a brand in this instance might be driven by identity considerations to convince the audience that you have a particular identity, but it might also be to sell the package of ideas, norms and practices and to carve out a niche for one's product and oneself within the global marketplace/international system.
Another important difference between brands and identities (especially when thinking about international politics) is that brands are not necessary. Whereas it is imperative for people/nations to construct an identity for themselves if they are to be able to act in the world 3 (and for collectivities if they are to even exist) brands are not like this. It is quite possible to have an international identity without having a brand. The opposite is not the case. All states, for example, make various identity claims, but not all states actively try to market a particular approach to global politics. The Nordic example is particularly interesting in this respect as at times deliberate efforts have been made by the Nordic political elite to market a common brand. This points to another reason for introducing the concept of brand, which is that discussions about a collective Nordic identity can become difficult because the Nordic countries generally narrate Nordicity in slightly different ways for different historical reasons (Østergård 1998; Hansen and Waever 1998) . Nordic identity means different things to different people in different locations.
However, I argue that aside from these various and sometimes divergent narratives the Nordic countries have collectively and rather deliberately tried to construct and market a singular 'Nordic brand', a particular common 'Nordic experience' or way of doing things that is also presented as applicable for others. It is this marketing of a particular brand that justifies treating the Nordic countries collectively in this article. It is also important, however, to reflect briefly on exactly 'who' has been engaged in these branding exercises. In this respect I posit the existence of a pan-Nordic epistemic community that had its origins in the Scandinavianist movement of the nineteenth century, but which was further enhanced in the early-mid twentieth century through the creation of various socalled Nordic societies and later the Nordic Council (Østergård 1998) . As I will argue, one of the reasons for the current weakening of the Nordic brand would seem to be the decline of a privileging of this trans-national community amongst the Nordic elite.
Before turning to the substantive discussion some methodological points are also necessary. Like identities brands cannot simply be proclaimed. To sell they need to be accepted and recognised as distinctive by the international audience (Ringmar 2002) .
Similarly, for the Nordic brand to exist it has also been important that collective Nordic positions built around cohesive policy preferences could be framed, and that there has been acceptance that each country has authority to speak on behalf of the Nordic Finally, the focus on the concept of 'brand' here makes it important to distinguish between 'rhetoric' (marketing) and 'reality' (actual practices). Obviously, from a discursive and constructivist perspective such a distinction is problematic since our discourses are constitutive of social reality (Searle 1995 Waever 1992; Mouritzen 1995) . As such the scheme outlined here is simply being used to draw out key points in relation to the question under discussion, whilst there is in reality much overlap between the analytical categories adopted below.
Peaceful societies and bridge builders
The Nordic model/brand rested, first and foremost, on a claim that the Nordic countries were exceptional in regard to the Cold War reading of international politics. Instead of the inevitable conflict between states the Nordics presented themselves as having successfully overcome the security dilemma between themselves to establish a region of peace and prosperity. This image became popularised in Karl Deutsch's (1957) understanding of the region as a unique security community in which stable expectations had developed such that an intra-Nordic war had become unthinkable. Another element in this peace driven approach to international relations was the adoption of a broadly anti-militarist stance to international affairs, meaning that resort to military force should be rejected in all but the direst of circumstances and that if possible international problems should be resolved through diplomacy and recourse to the UN/international law. Anti-militarism was understood differently in the different countries. In Denmark, beyond peacekeeping missions, the relevance and utility of armed force, even as a deterrent, was questioned (Rasmussen 2005b: 69) . In contrast, Finland and Sweden maintained considerable defensive capabilities and defence industries (Sweden even considered developing nuclear weapons in the 1950s), with these being justified as necessary to preserve their neutrality. 6 Thus, an effective military was required precisely so that it would not have to be used. At least in the Swedish case military readiness became seen as a key support to the ambition to be a 'moral great power' (Åselius 2005: 26-7) .
Taken together, this peaceful Nordic security community was seen as different from the norm during the Cold War, with the north existing as a region where power politics approaches were largely eschewed. Moreover, in Nordic identity-building discourses this 'peaceful' heritage was usually extended back to before the Cold War. In the Danish case the shift to peace driven approaches to international affairs was often dated to the 1864 Schleswig-Holstein War after which it was (and still is) argued Denmark dramatically reoriented its approach, rejecting realpolitik in favour of Scandinavian solidarity and neutrality (Joenniemi 2006: 19) . Whilst such accounts may be true they also contributed to the historicisation and naturalisation of this particular understanding of Nordicity.
During the Cold War such stories had practical implications. To an important degree to be Nordic meant retaining a distance from the Cold War conflict. Moreover, the Nordics engaged in considerable efforts to act as mediators between East and West and established a brand for themselves as bridge-builders in the East-West conflict. Such an approach was typified in the comment of Finnish President Urho Kekkonen (1970: 94) to the UN General Assembly in 1961 that "We see ourselves as physicians rather than judges; it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn, it is rather to diagnose and to try to cure". Key elements of such an approach, for example, became Finland's sponsorship of the CSCE process that put an emphasis on dialogue through the development of institutional links and that also put questions of human rights onto the Cold War debating table. Similarly, the limitations that Denmark and Norway placed on the idea of the 'Nordic brand', however, it is important that these links remained secret and only a handful their links with NATO was also understood as calming East-West tensions, whilst the fact that the Nordic countries became champions of nuclear disarmament should also be noted. 7 More particularly, the Nordic countries' geopolitical position between the Eastern and Western Blocs, but on the fringes and in the 'quiet corner' of Europe, also provided them with geographical resources by which they could develop this bridge-building role and brand. As Ingebritsen (2002) has pointed out, the Nordic countries did not sit back and withdraw into isolation from the Cold War, but became active 'norm entrepreneurs' who attempted to introduce and strengthen new global norms of cooperation, especially between the great powers.
Internationalist solidarism
The second element to the idea of Nordic exceptionalism during the Cold War can be Swedish criticisms even included the granting of a kind of asylum to American military deserters and were also evident in condemnations of the position of African Americans in the United States (Bangura 2004: 27) . Neutrality was not seen as constraining, but rather as conferring a right and duty to speak out on international and moral issues. Importantly criticism was not confined to the United States, but extended to the Soviet Union's actions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland as well as the apartheid regime in South Africa.
However, a focus on international justice was important for all the Nordic countries and as such a central element of Nordic identity and the Nordic model became the moral duty to help those less fortunate than oneself. The principal vehicle for this approach became the UN which was supported, not least because its multilateralism was seen as a way to curb the excesses of the great powers. Moreover, it was largely through the UN (and especially the UN Development Programme and other agencies like UNICEF and UNESCO) that the Nordic countries directed high levels of development aid and successfully carved out an image of themselves as being moral actors and 'good states', unlike other 'neo-liberal' northern states (including the EEC) that they depicted as intent on exploiting the Third World (Trägårdh 2002: 157) . Particularly notable was that the Nordic countries were the first to achieve the UN target of devoting 0.7 percent of GDP to Official Development Assistance (ODA). Moreover, the Nordics also stood out in that the distribution of ODA was only rarely tied to national commercial and strategic interests, but was more driven by the goal of helping those in greatest need (Lawler 2003: 158; Ingebritsen 2002: 18-19 ; Bergman in this issue).
The Nordic focus on international justice and equality was also evidenced by the fact that throughout the Cold War they provided 25 percent of the military personnel deployed on UN operations. They also promoted alternative approaches to security that took more account of issues pertinent in the Third World, such as concepts of common (e.g. the Palme Commission's 1982 report on Common Security), individual and human security,
and not least the idea of sustainable development. The result, as Laatikainen (2003: 417) notes, was that during the Cold War the Nordics carved out a niche for themselves, not only between East and West, but also between North and South. In the South they were not only identified as a single group, but were also understood as 'different' from the rest of the North (West). As she also notes, this was assisted by the fact that within the UN the Nordic countries acted as a single group. During the Cold War it was common for one of the Nordics to speak on behalf of them all. This was only possible because there was considerable cohesion between them in terms of policy preferences, but also because other states also recognised them as a cohesive group with distinct interests and policies that could be identified as distinctively 'Nordic' (Laatikainen 2003) . Similarly, Haggrén (2006) has noted that the Nordics' outspoken political aim within UNESCO was twofold.
First and foremost it was a branding exercise designed to stress "Nordic unity and create an image of Norden". Thus, the "central idea of the [sic] cooperation has been the [sic] cooperation itself, unity has mattered more than content". Second, it was to export Nordic values. Such collective and concerted action went a considerable way in gaining recognition for the development of a distinct 'Nordic brand'.
Egalitarian social democracy
The or to counter, no present or recent colonial record, and no racial problems, represents moderation and rationality in an assembly often swayed by fanatic or neurotic forces.
The accuracy, or otherwise of this statement (e.g., discrimination against the Sami population, Denmark's continuing colonial presence in the Faroes and Greenland, forced sterilisations…) is not the point. What matters is that Nordic identity and the Nordic brand were presented as the promise of a better, more advanced, more peaceful, less militarised future to that offered by the Cold War combatants. Thus, the Nordic countries did not simply try to isolate themselves from the Cold War: they marketed a brand of rational/modern society and international order that they believed should be projected onto the international scene and copied (Wahlbäck 1982: 13) .
The Nordic Brand: Passed its Sell-by-Date?
Today, however, it seems that the three elements to the brand of Nordic exceptionalism noted above are becoming less exceptional and less particularly Nordic. Moreover, in some instances the Nordics appear to have given up on aspects of the Nordic model and have become less interested in marketing the brand. Consequently, the elements of 'cohesion', 'recognition' and 'autonomy' that became central in the development and acceptance of a Nordic brand built around a specific Nordic model and position in international affairs are being undermined.
Peaceful societies and bridge builders
For example, ideas of the Nordic countries as particularly peaceful societies and bridgebuilders make less sense in a post-Cold War context. Given the transformations in Europe since the end of the Cold War, the idea that the Nordic region stands out as more peaceful and less conflict ridden than Central Europe has become problematic (Waever, 1992: 87) .
With the end of the Cold War the Nordic model appeared outdated and increasingly hard to market. Writing in the early 1990s Waever (1992) However, despite the apparent aim to maintain a distinct Nordic peace brand this has been undermined by several developments. Not least, despite some successes Nordic attempts to play a mediating role, particularly between the West and Russia have been sidelined. This is not only due to the Cold War's end, but because cooperation and confidence building between the US/NATO and Russia has increasingly taken place face to face in forums like the NATO-Russia Council, and has not required mediators or neutral venues. Moreover, in the context of 9/11 and the War on Terror, and with international politics increasingly being framed along different lines, the geopolitical position of the Nordic states is less of a resource (at least in terms of bridge building).
A further point concerns these societies' traditional anti-militarism. As noted above, antimilitarism has generally been understood in terms of an unwillingness to use military force, and one of the three sessions of the conference on Nordic Peace Diplomacy was specifically about "Nordic peace diplomacy versus the increased resort to force" (emphasis added) (Jakobsen et al., 2005: 2) . In the context of the War on Terror, however, anti-militarism understood this way is becoming problematic for some of the 
Developments in Denmark and Norway are especially interesting (on Denmark see
Lawler in this issue). In Norway, the previous Cold War view that the armed forces existed precisely so that their deterrence effect would mean they would not have to be used, has radically changed. Today they have been re-conceptualised precisely as a tool that 'should' be used. Or as the Norwegian Defence Minister declared in 2002, "the reason for having a defence is using it" (quoted in Graeger 2005: 412) . Similarly, whereas
Denmark opted out of some of the foreign and security policy elements of the Treaty on European Union in 1992, out of concerns that it might draw the country into 'militaristic adventurism' (Lawler 2003: 163) , Rasmussen (2005b: 67, 82 ) has demonstrated how, at least in government circles, the military is now seen as a tool of considerable utility, especially since the declaration of the War on Terror. As he puts it, the debate has shifted from focusing on whether force 'should ever' be used, to debating for which purposes it 'should be' used. Notably, therefore, the 2004 Defence Agreement argues that the Danish military forces should be redirected towards 'high-intensity operations' -war fighting rather than peacekeeping (Rasmussen 2005a: 46) . The shift entailed here is radical as it represents a Clausewitzian acceptance that war is simply politics by other means. In
Rasmussen's terms, in the Danish debate the question of whether or not to use force has become framed in terms of utility, not morality as previously.
Indeed, in its deployment of combat units to Afghanistan and Iraq Rynning (2003: 24) argues that Denmark has shifted from being a 'civilian actor', preferring to regulate the conflicts of other people and minimising the use of force, to becoming a 'strategic actor', "willing to use armed forces because they believe these to be appropriate means in the (allegedly) inevitable confrontation with hostile forces in the international arena". As such Denmark has forsaken traditional Nordic anti-militarism for a position alongside the US, UK, France and Russia, "all countries with a sense of vital interests and a willingness to fight militarily for them". Moreover, in this process Knudsen (2004) argues that Denmark (admittedly somewhat unwillingly) also gave up on its (and the Nordic model's) previous emphasis on the primary role of the UN in solving international conflicts, and instead placed support for the pre-emptive actions of a key ally above support for the primacy of international law. Finland, Sweden and Norway will also constitute one of the EU's Battle Groups that are being created as part of the European Rapid Reaction Force. 11 All this indicates a desire to retain a particular traditional 'Nordic' focus on issues of peace building and conflict resolution. However, as Carlsnaes (2005: 405) notes in regard to Sweden, activism in the peacekeeping field is increasingly being linked to the EU, rather than the other Nordic countries. The Nordic dimension is thus increasingly blurring with a European profile.
As such, although interest remains apparent in preserving a distinct Nordic brand and profile in this sphere, this brand is also being challenged. A number of contradictions are apparent: first in that the region no longer appears more peaceful than the rest of Europe;
and, second because some of the Nordic countries have de-emphasised and rejected the utility of the brand when it comes to military issues. Moreover, in a context when for alternative approaches and arguably blurring the notion of a Nordic brand (Møller 2005) . 10 On the growing emphasis on civilian crisis management in Sweden see, Rieker (2004: 380) . 11 Denmark cannot participate as a result of its defence opt out.
peacekeeping, crisis management and stability creation is being dominated by EU structures it is becoming harder to maintain a distinct Nordic profile.
Internationalist solidarism
Similar concerns exist in the second area, where the previous emphasis on internationalist solidarism and Third Worldism as central to the Nordic model and a 'Nordic' identity, role and outlook on world affairs, has also been challenged, though in two distinct ways. Second, however, although internationalist solidarism clearly does remain important to the broader Nordic approach to international affairs, 12 and Norway, for example, continues to present itself as a 'humanitarian great power' (Graeger 2005: 415) , 13 the Nordics no longer appear exceptional in this regard. Indeed, this element has become a broader European concern, with the EU becoming to some extent 'Nordicised' in this respect. Thus, it is the British government that has led moves towards cancelling Third
World debt, and as Laatikainen (2003: 427-36) notes, the result is that Nordic internationalism is increasingly melding into a more general European profile to the extent that specific 'Nordic positions' are no longer so clearly identifiable or marketable.
In Region has largely ended and as such so has the Nordics' post-Cold War mission in the region. Second, having successfully exported principles of internationalist solidarism to them, the Baltic States appear better equipped than the Nordics in exporting these principles further east. As such it appears they might be co-opting a Nordic 14 The first pillar focuses on cultural, educational and linguistic ties amongst the Nordic states. The second internationalist mission, identity and brand for themselves that will not only compete with the Nordic brand, but will arguably appear more plausible and attractive to others by virtue of their having gone through the transition process themselves (Ilves 2003: 197) At the same time, not everyone has given up on the Nordic economic model. Arguably the notion of 'economic identity' remains important, which is to say that the Nordic economic model has a future to the extent that it continues to be a fundamental element of national and Nordic identity discourses -of what it is to be us. These discourses are sedimented to different degrees in the Nordic states, being perhaps strongest in Sweden.
Once identity is in the equation the key question for the future of the economic model is not so much whether Nordic models of capitalism are any longer 'feasible' (a kind of rationalist judgement), but rather the extent to which it is about identity and being. To the extent that the idea of being exceptional and different is a central element of Nordic identity, then this in itself may be enough reason not to conform to a neo-liberal agenda.
At the same time, it is important to also note that some politicians continue to champion the Nordic model precisely in terms of its economic viability. To quote Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja (2004; also see 2003) .
We should ask whether we seek to enhance European competitiveness through a neoliberal agenda and its one-sided emphasis on labour market flexibility, deregulation and profit maximization, or whether we base our reforms on the indisputable strengths of the European should be welcomed and we should not cling to the Nordic label or mourn the loss of Nordic difference and exceptionalism out of egoistic reasons of the need for recognition.
As such, Tuomioja's (2004) repackaging of the Nordic brand in European terms (rather than seeing the Nordic as different and better than negatively framed 'European models' as during the Cold War) is an interesting development. So long as people are promoting 'Nordic' values we should not be concerned if they are labelled 'European' rather than 'Nordic'. Likewise, we should not be sad if the Nordic reference group and ability to influence is replaced by other groupings of which the Nordics are a part (e.g., EU).
However, a more cautious perspective is also warranted as it is unclear that all that has happened is the repackaging of the Nordic brand in European terms. This is to say that arguably the Nordics have not been completely successful in marketing their brand of internationalism to their European partners. Instead, it rather seems that at least some of the Nordic countries have been influenced by, and begun to buy into, either US or other brands of internationalism currently on offer. In short, Nordic internationalism, as traditionally defined, is not the same as Bushian/Blairite neo-liberal neoconservative/theologically-inspired internationalism, or arguably even the same as the universalising internationalism of some of the 'old Europeans'. As Lawler (2005) has argued, what is being lost with the melding of the Nordic brand of internationalism with Western/European internationalist approaches more generally is a social democratic inspired alternative to the current liberalist agendas, with their focus on opening markets and individualist understandings of social order. In contrast, the social democratic inspired Nordic brand has traditionally been one that emphasises the right of countries to choose their own path (rather than have a model imposed on them) and that arguably has a better track record when it comes to emphasising issues of distributive justice and egalitarianism in world politics (see Bergman's article).
The second way of answering the question is to look at the relationship between the Nordic brand of exceptionalism and particular constructions of Nordic identity. Arguably, if the Nordic model and a distinctive Nordic international profile are disappearing then this raises questions for the construction of national identities in the Nordic area. For example, will the Nordic marker lose any relevance whatsoever and instead be replaced by the marker of 'Europe'? Will ideas of Nordicity be reduced to simply cultural, geographic and historic elements? Would this necessarily be a bad thing? Perhaps the key question here is how essential the idea/brand of 'exceptionalism' is to Nordic identity and whether Nordicity can be told in different ways? Here, it is interesting to note the tension within the Nordic brand between its identity element of exceptionalism (implying constant difference) and its emphasis on being a model (implying others can become like us). The result is that to the extent that the brand has been successfully sold it threatens its very existence as a model of exceptionalism. Thus, to the extent that being Nordic is equated with being 'different', 'exceptional' and 'better than' others then accepting the demise of the Nordic may be difficult. Importantly, though, such a development may be easier for some than others. In particular, for the Finns the melding of the Nordic with the European is less problematic since historically a Nordic identification has been seen as bringing them closer to Europe and the West. In contrast, for Denmark, Norway and Sweden 'Nordic' has been told more in contradistinction from 'Europe'. Thus, whilst all might have bought into the Nordic brand, some of the countries may be better able to cope with its demise than others, and for whom the desire to reconstitute a Nordic brand of exceptionalism may be stronger and result in renewed efforts to be norm entrepreneurs in the future.
This returns us to the initial distinction made between the concepts of brand and identity.
On the one hand, one of the article's implicit arguments has been that whereas during the Cold War a pan-Nordic elite found a clear interest in marketing a collective Nordic brand (not least to distance the region from the Cold War, but also to promote norms, values and an experience understood as distinctly 'Nordic'), today such a collective interest has weakened. The consequent decline of the pan-Nordic community might explain why the Nordic brand has ossified around largely Cold War understandings, rather than developing and being updated with a new model and a re-branding of the Nordic in terms, for example, of the networked society, or a kind of Nokia Norden. Whilst this is happening at national levels (e.g. Castells and Himanen 2002) the idea that the Nordic countries might share a strategic interest in such a project seems absent. Finally, however, even if the future of the Nordic brand is in the balance, the loss of this brand would not entail the end of Nordic identity(ies) as such, even though the brand of exceptionalism and the model has been constitutive of these identities to some extent. What it might mean though is that Nordic identity may need to be reconstituted around other elements where being 'exceptional' would be less important and where the foundationalist myth of Nordic exceptionalism might, for example, be replaced by a more positive reading of Europe.
